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Abstract: Recent trends indicate diminishing public engagement with formal electoral politics in many
advanced liberal democracies, especially among the younger generations. However, evidence also
suggests that there has been a simultaneous interest by many young citizens in political consumerism.
In large part, this interest is shaped as a response to the individualisation and strict ‘economism’ driven
by the underlying forces of neoliberalism. Disenfranchised and disillusioned by the seeming incapacity
of the purely political sphere to respond to their individualised claims, and having internalised the
neoliberal critique of democracy, these young empowered citizen-consumers often search for the ‘political’
within the bounds of the marketplace and are increasingly attracted to consumerist methods of political
participation, such as boycotting and buycotting. Given the susceptibility of political consumerism to a
neoliberal modus operandi, the lack of available literature problematising its emergence as a response to
neoliberal principles is somewhat surprising. The present article will address this gap by connecting the
declining levels of electoral participation among younger generations in post-crisis Europe to the rise of
political consumerism within the neoliberal ideological hegemony of the ‘marketopoly’. We distinguish
between two antithetical, but complimentary effects. Firstly, the internalised neoliberal critique of
democracy emphasises the ‘push’ out of the public into the commercial sphere. Secondly, the emerging
individualisation of modern ‘liquid’ politics advanced by the postmaterialist sensitivities of young
people’s previously affluent socialisation call attention to the existence of a parallel ‘pull’ effect into the
‘marketopoly’, as a habitus of youth political participation. In both cases, the reorganisation of political
participation as consumption, and the re-styling of young citizens as ‘empowered’ consumers, delineates
political consumerism as an efficacious response to their political disengagement in an increasingly
marketised world.
Keywords: Neoliberalism; Political Participation; Postmaterialism; Political Consumerism; Young people
1. Introduction
Youth politics has gained momentum as an academic field across several social sciences disciplines
since the turn of the new millennium [1–8]. Prominent within this field is the controversy over the term
‘youth political apathy’ [9–12], especially since the declining electoral participation of young people is
being perceived as a continuous hindrance for the future and proper functioning of several democracies
around the globe. Moreover, political scientists point out that the perceived loss of confidence and
social ties, especially for the young generations, does not remain limited to the political arena but
permeates all aspects of civil-society [13]. While it is easy to accuse the young of being part of a selfish,
apathetic, and predominately materialistic generation, recent research has instead indicated that young
people continue to demonstrate a strong desire to partake in democratic life, but this desire is met with
social and contextual obstacles [10]. Hence, a significant part of recent academic research has been
oriented towards identifying the individual and collective factors which may be constituting the social
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characteristics of political youth (dis)engagement [1,10,14,15]. The term political (dis)engagement
indicates the engagement—or lack thereof—of citizens with political institutions [16], processes,
and decision-making [17]. Political participation stands as one particular expression of political
engagement, which is defined as “those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed
at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take” [18] (p. 1).
Political participation may be expressed in several ways, both conventional and non-conventional.
Conventional political participation includes voting, election campaigning, or donating to a political
party. Alternatively, non-conventional political participation occurs primarily outside of the electoral
arena, and varies from signing petitions and participating in protests to daubing political graffiti [16].
The decline of trust in traditional political institutions [13] has often been identified as a primary
factor behind the corresponding emergence of alternative socio-political arenas, within which political
consumerism holds a central position. Research across different disciplines and theoretical traditions
has identified a process of ‘politicisation of consumption’ [19], according to which, consumption
patterns are increasingly related to civic values, pointing to a possible levelling out of the dividing lines
between citizens and consumers. Inglehart’s postmaterialism thesis [20–22] provides an influential and
complimentary interpretation, placing emphasis on the reorientation of individual and civic values
which has led in turn to a widening of the available repertoire of political action. In such a context,
political consumerism (which consists of buycotting and boycotting products for political, ethical,
or environmental reasons) has been proposed as a relatively new form of political participation [23],
which moves away from the traditional definitions of electoral participation by harnessing individual
consumer power and directing it towards collective public issues. In this way, it blurs the boundaries
between the conventional notions of citizen and consumer.
A sizeable body of work has been dedicated to the study of the determinants of political
consumerism in the last decade, much of which focuses on the individual level, within a single
country [24–27]. However, another strand of literature draws on comparative research that stresses
the significance of the existing socio-structural contexts both as opportunities for, and hindrances
to, political consumerism [28–32]. The common ground of this strand is that the individual and
collective motivations underpinning political consumerist decisions do not emerge in a vacuum.
Instead, they are determined by the prevailing characteristics of the societies in which they take
place [33]. Working within this tradition and drawing on Anthony Downs’ ‘An Economic Theory
of Democracy’ [34], scholars [35] proceed to emphasise the role of the hegemonic ideology in each
society as a determinant of political consumerism, and present evidence which suggests that political
consumerist behaviour has been significantly affected by the spread of neoliberalism and neoliberal
politics, both on ideological [36] and social policy grounds [37].
The present paper seeks to disentangle these dynamics by distinguishing between two antithetical,
but complimentary effects in post-crisis Europe. Drawing from Crouch’s ‘Post-Democracy’ [38], we propose
that on the one hand, the emergence of neoliberal economics has significantly contributed to the political
disengagement of young people, enabling us to identify a series of ‘push’ factors away from traditional
political domains. Indeed, Hay [39] correlates neoliberalism with an increased rejection of institutional
politics. The spread of neoliberalism has socialised the young generations in a socio-political context
where electoral democracy loses prominence and politicians are faced with increased scepticism [36].
Whereas Crouch [38] stresses the ‘push’ out of the public and into the commercial sphere, we will call
attention to the ‘pull’ factors activated primarily by the tenacity of the neoliberal doctrine with regard
to the power of the free market. The neoliberal emphasis on consumerist principles, coupled with
the increased individualisation of late modernity [40,41], has instigated a consumer-based approach
to politics, especially among the younger generations; this has fostered the emergence of alternative
forms of political engagement which use the market as an arena of socio-political fermentation.
Prominent among these new types of individualistic and consumer-based participatory forms stands
the notion of political consumerism. Through the practice of politicising the personal, political
consumerism constitutes a form of political participation whereby individuals harness the power of
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their personal choices to trigger collective political change [42,43]. By doing so, it manages to reconcile
the individualistic tendencies of the neoliberal market-based economy with the collective appeal of the
empowered citizen-consumer [10,44], which neoliberalism itself has brought forward.
This being the case, political consumerism, demonstrating acute reflexivity to the spirit of the times,
contests the neoliberal market-based democratic paradigm that brought it into existence, and may thus
be considered as a response to the apathy and individualisation effects of neoliberalism itself. We will
commence our analysis in the following section by laying out the grounds for the emergence of the
neoliberal rationale, and how by shaping the convergence of the previously distant notions of citizen
and consumer, it gave rise to a set of ‘push’ factors away from traditional political engagement.
2. The Neoliberal Rationale
The term neoliberalism was first coined during a meeting in Paris in 1938. Among the attendees
were Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, who came to be two of the most prominent representatives
of the ideology [45]. Due to its historical multilinearity, there is no consensus with respect to a single
working definition of neoliberalism. Existing understandings, however, present the concept by focusing
on the degree of state intervention within the classical, laissez-faire liberal paradigm [46]. Harvey thus
defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” [46] (p. 18).
The range of available definitions stress a process of reconstitution of the power of the state through,
and interplay between, the tools of privatisation, finance, and market forces. State interventions in the
economy are diminished, while the onus of the state as the primary caretaker of its citizens’ welfare is
similarly reduced [46].
The neoliberal principles were initially delineated in Hayek’s ‘The Road to Serfdom’, first published
in 1944 [47]. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on affirming free markets, is remodelling “every human
need or desire in a profitable enterprise” [48] (p. 28) and thus is “ . . . reducing all forms of life to
economic ones” [49] (p. 11). It perceives competition as the distinctive property of human relations,
and therefore it defines citizens primarily as consumers, whose democratic resolution is best exercised
by buying and selling within a deregulated global market. Any attempt to limit market competition is
thus perceived as detrimental to liberty, and therefore taxing or any kind of government regulations
should be minimised. Collective bargaining and trade unions are deemed as market distortions
which hamper the restoration of a natural hierarchy. In turn, inequality is considered as a virtuous
premium for the generation of wealth, which is destined to trickle-down to all members of the economy.
In contrast, any egalitarian effort is not only counter-productive, but also morally repugnant, since the
free market will grant everyone what they deserve according to their individual contribution to
the economy.
Peck [50] distinguishes between the ‘roll-back’ and the ‘roll-out’ effects of neoliberalism.
The former refers to the institutional, laissez-faire economic principles of neoliberal reasoning,
such as the deregulation and privatisation of the state. The latter, however, refers to the attempt
of neoliberalism to harness the existing social forces and to remould them around its own objectives,
either by accentuating competition as an inherent force of human nature, or by the marketisation
of previously non-market social domains. This double assault of neoliberal rationality on both
the existing institutional and social constructs has been exemplified in the work of Foucault [51],
who describes neoliberalism not as an externally-induced form of ideological control, but instead as a
highly internalised form of self-regulation and self-discipline. Likewise, Hayek [47] accepts that the
competitive rationality of neoliberalism does not reflect any inherent nature of the individual. Instead,
he asserts the need of market rationality to be instilled in individuals through an active and conscious
adjustment process of their social experiences [47]. Therefore, the society as a whole has to undergo
a process of internalisation of the neoliberal values. As a result, entrepreneurism, consumerism,
the scarcity hypothesis, and the corresponding competition of resources that follows it have been
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internalised to such an extent by neoliberal subjects that these processes and phenomena combine to
define people’s political identity and behaviour [52]. Moreover, the adoption of the neoliberal rationale
by think-tanks, academia, and political parties across the ideological spectrum further intensifies
its internalisation by individuals who become increasingly competitive for scarce employment and
insecure jobs, falling wages and increasing price levels [53]. So ubiquitous has the roll-out process
of neoliberalism been that it is hardly recognised as a distinct ideology. Instead it is often portrayed
as merely descriptive of a natural force, similar to gravity or a biological law reflecting the intrinsic
human nature, neglecting to recall that we are referring to a “philosophy that arose as a conscious
attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power” [45] (p. 3).
Neoliberalism and Political (Dis)Engagement
The present and ongoing global economic crisis, with its detrimental residue in the purely
economic sphere, has revealed the deceptive paradoxes behind the dominant neoliberal economic
order [54]. However, for the first time in many years, it has also opened the discussion on tracing
realistic alternatives that do not genuflect to a hegemonic free-market ethic. Perhaps the most negative
effect of this neoliberal hegemony is not the economic impact it has instigated, but the political one.
As the responsive power of the state is significantly diminished, so is the capacity of the citizens
to influence their livelihoods through electoral participation. The neoliberal doctrine proposes the
market as an alternative arena in which citizens may exercise individual choice through their spending
behaviour. However, just as wealth and income are not equally distributed among the constituents
of a democracy [55], neither is the citizen’s ability to influence the decisions pertaining to their
community [49].
Such is the ideological hegemony that neoliberalism has achieved, that global political leaders
often accede to neoliberal technocratic solutions for addressing economic and social problems [49].
A prominent example is the reliance of European Union (EU) leaders on the strict enforcement of
austerity measures as a response to the ongoing economic crisis in several European democracies;
this is despite evidence that the crisis itself was brought forward by neoliberal policies, and that the
impact of austerity programmes seems to be aggravating it [56]. Furthermore, these decisions are
usually determined not by the EU’s democratic institutions, but by technocrats operating behind
closed doors [49], pointing towards what Habermas would refer to as “a dismantling of democracy”
within the EU [57]. Consequently, the resulting disempowerment, especially among the lower- and
middle-income cohorts and the young, turns into disenfranchisement, as more parties of the traditional
right—but progressively also of the former left—accede to the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism.
Published work in the area has identified three distinct paths through which neoliberalism may
negatively affect the propensity of young people to engage with formal politics, ‘pushing’ them away
from participating in traditional democratic deliberation processes [38]. Firstly, the neoliberal insistence
on the importance of economic policies over purely political responses has rendered political actors
unable to respond to the demands of their constituency [37]. Secondly, and as a consequence of the
above, the neoliberal critique of democracy itself has made the constituents highly suspicious of the
motives of politicians [39]. Finally, the electoral inequality that has resulted from the proliferation of the
neoliberal ideology has acted as an additional barrier to the franchise and the subjective understanding
of citizenship [58], limiting both young people’s capacity, as well as their motivation, to engage with
electoral politics.
Hart and Henn [36] discern an interconnectedness of these strands, which, when combined
and reinforced by its roll-out process, form a neoliberal matrix that discourages young people’s
electoral participation. More specifically, the rules that safeguard the free-market principles should
be untouched by democratic deliberation. As such, technocratic limitations should be enforced on
democracy, especially when it comes to market interventions, since only through the free market
is social emancipation possible. It follows, therefore, that politicians are increasingly bound to the
technocratic parameters of a free-market logic, irrespective of the mandate of their constituency.
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Building upon this logic, James Buchanan [59] expanded the neoliberal critique of democracy.
Armed with the assumption of rational, utility-maximising agents, Buchanan claims that politicians
are bound to govern in favour of their own narrow interests rather than those of their constituents.
Buchanan’s critique of the capacity of democracy itself to respond to social problems is threefold.
Firstly, collective decision-making is unable to satisfy individual preferences. Secondly, and following
from the previous argument, the same politicians are likely to support increased state control, in order
to maintain their own power, and to increase their influence and salaries. These criticisms point back
to a principal-agent problem: “Agents are supposed to represent the interests of their principals, but in
fact they tend to put their own interests ahead of the interests of those whom they are supposed
to represent” [60]. Thirdly, profit-maximising politicians are likely to favour certain social groups
in return for votes. The political parties are therefore prone to converge towards the ideological
centre [34], in search of maximising their share of the constituency by ideologically approaching
the median voter, making these parties especially inelastic to the demands of the underrepresented
youth [61,62]. This last argument may also explain why young people tend to refrain from voting,
even though they may exhibit a deep awareness about political issues [63], they may believe that
voting is important [64], and they are persevering supporters of democracy in principle [65]. It is
therefore only when the salient issues on the political agenda particularly pertain to them that they will
exhibit a significantly higher predisposition to voting. This is evidenced by the recent surge in young
voters’ turnout in Britain (at the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 UK European Union
(EU) referendum, and the 2017 General Election [66–68]) and across the EU [69], when the prevailing
political agenda could no longer afford to exclude them from the debate.
The above critique portrays politicians as not only unable to influence political outcomes within
a technocratic economic environment, but also as inherently selfish (and as such, untrustworthy)
and thus unable to represent the mandate of their constituency. In the contemporary European
political context, this is reflected in recent empirical research [65] which suggests that young people
are disengaged with electoral politics because the latter is “ . . . hierarchical and remote, the province
of self-serving elitists with little interest in their lives” [70]. The consumer logic that has permeated
the neoliberal subject allows for expressing their support or rejection of the available options by
deliberately ‘purchasing’ among the available options of politicians and political parties [34]. However,
this will inevitably be expressed by increased disengagement from electoral politics if the interests of
the young voters continue to be underrepresented in the political debate, in favour of the median voter.
As the neoliberal critique of democracy continues, only the existence of a free market permits
individual preferences to be adequately expressed and satisfied, undistorted by a collective
decision-making process. The adoption of free-market principles as a response to the failures
of democracy to reflect individual preferences via a majoritarian decision-making system calls
for the conviction that our understanding of citizenship as represented by the sovereign citizen
should be replaced by a shift towards the sovereign consumer. This consumer-oriented democracy,
or ‘marketopoly’ as Lekakis [35] terms it, may more adequately reflect the individual preferences
within the market as a highly decentralised framework of political action, and thus increasingly ‘pull’
the underrepresented young people to operate within it. Political expression becomes in this way a
commercialised product, and the widespread diffusion of the neoliberal creed heralds the birth of the
‘citizen-consumer’, and the end of traditional understandings of citizenship [71].
The limitations imposed by neoliberalism on civic life stem from the concession that “traditional
domains of civic activity are marginalised by uncontrolled market forces” [72] (p. 61). However, these
same market forces allow for the expression of the ‘political’ within the domain of the marketplace.
The following sections will attempt to trace these ‘pull’ factors exerted by the marketplace which make
it conducive to market-oriented means of political participation.
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3. Consumption and Citizenship: Towards an Empowered Citizen-Consumer
In the previous section, we examined how the neoliberal paradigm has shaped the convergence
of the previously distant notions of citizen and consumer. Cohen [73] emphasises the dichotomous
role between the identities of citizens and consumers. The former are defined as individuals who have
the obligation to fulfil certain civil duties in connection to the government, in order to guarantee their
rights and privileges. By way of contrast, consumers are instead perceived as merely preoccupied
with satisfying their private material needs and desires. Schudson [74], however, emphasises the
complementarity of the roles of the citizen and the consumer, since, as he argues, consumer choices
have the potential to be political, and have often historically been so. As such, consumer choices are no
less an “inferior form of human activity compared to voting at the polling place or otherwise exercising
citizenship” [74] (p. 237). A recent position has identified the consumer as a moral agent, with
specific consumption patterns intended as a means to a political end [75] (p. 240). With the numerous
boycotting campaigns organised by the people of the Puerta del Sol and Sydagma Square in 2011,
and of activists for animal rights, ecosystems, fair and solidarity trade, among others, civic values
such as citizens’ rights, equity, ethics, sustainability, and social responsibility have been related with
increasing frequency to consumerism. This signals the possibility of an eventual collapse of the borders
between the previously unrelated notions of ‘citizenship’ and ‘consumerism’ [76].
Having thus established the emergence of the neoliberal citizen-consumer above, we will proceed
by identifying the ‘pull’ factors that may allure young neoliberal subjects into alternative forms
of political participation within the market context. In doing so, we will consider the arrival of
the ‘empowered citizen-consumer’ by reinventing the role of the consumer as no longer a mere
passive appeaser of one’s material needs, but as an integral agent of political responsibility within
a neoliberal socio-political context. Central within this assertion stands the neoliberal axiom that
democracy would be more efficient if it was organised according to consumerist and free-market
guidelines [36,50], which in turn is based on the neoliberal emphasis of economic over political freedom
as the foundation of liberty [77]. In fact, Friedman [78] posed that economic freedom is indispensable
in achieving political freedom, whereas Hayek [47] considered economic freedom essential in creating
and preserving liberty.
The supporting literature in this area may be derived from several previously unrelated academic
disciplines. Emerging Marketing theories have started to emphasise the weight of competition and
consumer choice in a digital, global, and de-regulated market economy, thereby shifting the power
balance in favour of consumers. Kotler et al. [79] identify overcapacity as the main problem for businesses:
“Customers are scarce, not products. Demand, not supply, is the problem. Overcapacity leads to hyper
competition, with too many goods chasing too few customers. And most goods and services lack
differentiation. The result: dog-eat-dog pricing and mounting business failures” [79] (p. ix).
Dickinson and Svenson [80] argue that in modern affluent societies most people have what they
need and much of what they want. Hence, people will demonstrate a finite willingness to consume,
and so the old economic tools of price and volume manipulation will no longer suffice to ensure
sustainable profits to the producer. For a number of years, producers relied almost exclusively on
increasing the production volumes and cutting down prices, based on the assumption of infinite
consumer needs and wants. However, the more the markets satisfy consumers’ materialist needs and
the more they appease their postmaterialist wants, the more ethical and even aesthetical considerations
of sustainable consumption will come into play.
This ‘Beautiful Corporations’ thesis [80] is rooted in the premise of “ . . . empowered consumers
investing citizenship considerations into their everyday purchase decisions” [81] (p. 119). The argument,
therefore, is that consumers have become more empowered in relation to the producers, and thus
their consumption patterns will demonstrate a wider social awareness with regard to their impact on
the public sphere [81], a position which in turn closely aligns with Inglehart’s [20,22] postmaterialist
thesis. The shift from materialism to postmaterialism in young people’s value orientations has been
a widely influential and empirically supported determinant of the rise of non-electoral politics [82].
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Inglehart’s [20–22] postmaterialist thesis posits that increasing material security has resulted in a shift
in people’s value orientations which enables them to place more emphasis on concerns related to
self-expression, human rights, and environmental issues [83]. Moreover, previous research indicates
that political consumerism is primarily a tool of young postmaterialists, who are distrustful of
political institutions [84]. The relevance of postmaterialist value preferences to political consumerism
thus becomes pertinent. Firstly, buycotting and boycotting, as an expression of political action,
are consistent with the lifestyle and the non-conventional participation methods that are popular
among the postmaterialist cohorts [83]. Secondly, instead of consuming merely to satisfy one’s
material needs, the political consumer adds ethical, social, environmental, and political—hence,
postmaterialist—considerations to the product of choice. Thirdly, the historical shift from materialist
to postmaterialist preferences may justify the perceived increase of political consumerism in
recent decades.
Hence, postmaterialist consumers, having satisfied their purely materialist needs and being
empowered with a plethora of consumer choices, will become less susceptible to simple advertisement
wiles and sales promotions. Instead, they will seek to position themselves within a postmaterialist
political field which draws heavily from the principles of the marketplace. Given the shift from the
scarcity of goods to the scarcity of consumers, the customer is placed “at the beginning rather than the
end of the production-consumption cycle” [85] (p. 7), and will be empowered to such an extent that,
for Kotler et al. [79] (pp. 36–37), he or she will be transformed to a ‘prosumer’—able to influence the
production process itself. The prosumer is now able to afford consumption patterns which place “ . . .
emphasis on liberation, the freedom to construct identities, and the ability of consumers to empower
themselves through the deliberate orchestration of commodity meanings” [86] (p. 8). Consequently,
the emergence of a postmaterialist critical mass has only recently rendered possible what Kotler
describes as a “democracy of goods” [79] (p. 9).
Despite the robust theoretical evidence in favour of postmaterialist value preferences as a defining
factor behind political consumerism, the available empirical evidence remains inconclusive, if not
contradictory. Copeland [82] finds that there is a strong causal link between postmaterialist values and
engagement with political consumerism. In contrast, Baek [87] finds that although political consumers
place more emphasis on environmental issues and education, there exist no significant correlations
with respect to abortion, racial discrimination, or taxation. Conversely, Andersen and Tobiasen [88]
find no evidence of correlation between postmaterialism and political consumerism.
The inconclusive nature of the postmaterialist thesis with respect to its application to the
emergence of political consumerism calls for a shift of focus from value preferences to more contextual
factors, such as neoliberalism. Political consumerism may indeed be understood as an expression of
the value preferences of young postmaterialists. However, political consumerism has the potential
to traverse the use of the market as merely a commercial arena, and to transform it into a habitus
instilled with political meaning, where everyday consumption practices can be interpreted as a
direct result of a more general shift of participatory processes towards identity-based pursuits,
lifestyle participation, and individualism, and therefore as expressions of citizenship of late modernity.
The following section will thus define political consumerism, and trace the ‘pull’ factors behind it,
in the postmodernist literature.
3.1. Political Consumerism
Political consumerism is formally defined as the “ . . . consumer choice of producers and products
on the basis of attitudes and values of personal and family well-being as well as ethical or political
assessment of business and government practice” [89] (p. xiv), and is expressed by two types of
activities: consumer boycotts and buycotts. By engaging in boycotts, people “challenge companies
to change objectionable or undesirable business practices by tarnishing their reputation or bottom
lines” [90] (p. 174). Correspondingly, by engaging in buycotts, people “purchase specific products or
brands deliberately to reward companies for desirable behaviour” [90] (p. 174). Even though boycotts
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and buycotts lead to contrasting business outcomes, the literature on political consumerism has often
examined them as analogous, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Nevertheless, they have each
gained momentum as forms of political engagement in the last decades, especially among the young.
Even after the outbreak of the financial crisis, political consumerism remains at the forefront
of political action. Latest figures for the value of all ethical purchases in the UK recorded an 8.5%
growth during 2015 to an impressive £38 billion of overall value, whereas consumers’ ethical spending
in their local community surged by 11.7% [91]. These figures exhibit a continuous growth trend for
the thirteenth consecutive year, reflecting the persisting appeal of political consumerism, despite the
outbreak of the crisis. Similarly, and as a result of these increasing consumption trends, on the
production side several corporations are responding by developing corporate social responsibility
schemes which seek to monetise the increasing demand for political agency and moral responsibility
of the production [92].
Newman and Bartels [42] find that young people from 16 to 30 years of age are particularly more
likely than their older contemporaries to partake in political consumerism, and that unlike conventional
political participation such as voting in elections, political consumerism is likely to decrease with
age. Elsewhere, Gotlieb and Wells [93] find a strong positive relationship between engagement in
political consumerism at a young age and the development of those civic competencies necessary
for the engagement in institutional politics as adults. However, Wicks, Morimoto, and Maxwell [94]
demonstrate that the predictors of adult political consumerism do not necessarily coincide with those
of youth political consumerism. Despite these findings, studies on youth political consumerism remain
somewhat limited [95].
In any case, the perceived rise of political consumerism offers an example of the changing political
practices of citizens in late modernity. Scholars of late-modernity posit that the perceived growth
of political consumerist practices follows as a direct result of a more general shift of participatory
processes towards identity-based pursuits, lifestyle participation, individualism, and postmaterialist
value orientations [22,41,96]. The following section will therefore trace the ‘pull’ factors of political
consumerism considered within the relevant postmodern literature.
3.1.1. Political Consumerism and Postmodernism
As Nonomura [95] has suggested, scholars of late modernity contend that the traditional
sociodemographic indicators of participation, such as social class, are progressively losing prominence
in favour of a wider motivational shift towards what Beck and Beck-Gernsheim [97] have referred to as
‘self-politics’, or what Giddens [96] has termed ‘life-politics’. Attempting to respond to the increasingly
restrained options for democratic agency in the face of neoliberal capitalism, it is argued that the
postmodern citizen-consumer will resort to the politicisation of leisure and consumption as a means to assert
their political agency and self-actualisation [95]. Referring to the work of Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti [89],
Nonomura suggests that “the growth of political consumerism reflects the growing understanding among
citizens—especially young people—of ‘the politics behind products’ and the ‘complex social and normative
context’ (i.e., late capitalism, neoliberalism, economic globalisation) in which production and day-to-day
consumption occurs” [95] (p. 236). Consequently, political consumerism becomes a neoliberal response of
political participation based on ‘individualised responsibility taking’ [31] (p. 2).
Political consumerism therefore has been proposed as an emerging form of political participation [31]
which departs from the traditional definitions of citizenship, by inserting the individual consumer power
into collective public issues, blurring the boundaries between the conventional notions of citizen and
consumer. Political consumerism, through the practice of politicising the personal, constitutes a form
of individualised lifestyle politics, whereby individuals harness the power of their personal choices to
achieve political change [42,43]. In doing so, it conflates the political and economic sphere to the point
that to separate them serves less of a purpose than to actually assume that they affect each other.
Findings from Stolle et al. [84] indicate that political consumerism is primarily a tool of those
who are distrustful of political institutions, and expresses an essentially individualistic form of civic
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action, reiterating the ‘push’ element of the neoliberal critique of democracy. But despite its essentially
individualistic nature, political consumerism has also a dormant collective appeal. Micheletti [98],
building on the works of Beck and of Giddens [96,97] on reflexive modernity, interprets this interplay
between the individual and the collective appeal of political consumerism on the grounds of the
increasing interconnectedness of the private and public arenas of postmodern societies. The political
consumers therefore, are convinced that their individual consumer choices will have collective political
consequences, so that each person partakes in “global responsibility taking” [98] (p. 2). From a
postmodern perspective, “ . . . individuals can feel themselves to be authors of global political
acts” [98] (p. 2). The proximity of the individual and the collective interplay therefore render political
consumerism especially appealing to the postmodern citizen-consumer.
For these postmodern citizen-consumers, the market becomes a political arena in which their
individual values are reflected in the contents of their shopping basket, whilst their ‘votes’ are
‘cast’ at the checkout [99] (p. 46). Consequently, the consumer becomes a political agent and a
carrier of political responsibility. Although the demands of political consumerists are still contingent
on institutional political deliberation spaces, “when aggregated, these individual choices have the
potential to transcend the actions of individuals to form political movements that may, in turn,
challenge political and economic powers” [33] (p. 471). By capturing the public imagination, they may
put new items on the institutional political agendas and thus deliberate on a significantly more
far-reaching range of policy-issues and concerns than they might otherwise have done. Consequently,
policies that might have previously been unthinkable may become a reality [82].
Therefore, political consumerism qualifies as a response to the individualisation of the neoliberal
creed, since it obscures the distinctions between the private and public realms [82] and is explicitly
directed to the market instead of the state. Moreover, political consumerist practices are to a large extent
self-directed, and information is disseminated through informal peer-to-peer networks [100] instead of
being coordinated by formal political institutions, or driven by large-scale elite communication [82].
Sassatelli [75] (p. 188) stresses that, in the words of Beck [41], “If modernity is a democracy oriented
to producers, late modernity is a democracy oriented to consumers: a pragmatic and cosmopolitan
democracy where the sleepy giant of the ‘sovereign citizen-consumer’ is becoming a counterweight
to big transnational corporations”. Borrowing from a Marxist critique of capitalism, the question of
whether neoliberalism contains the seeds of its own destruction by nurturing the emergence of the
‘sovereign citizen-consumer’ is yet to be answered.
Political consumerism has been widely examined as a market-oriented form of political participation
within a postmodern context. It is exactly this postmodern appeal of political consumerism that renders it
especially appealing to the young citizen-consumers of late modernity. However, given the susceptibility
of political consumerism to a neoliberal modus operandi, the lack of available literature problematising
its emergence as a response to neoliberal principles is somewhat surprising. The following section will
thus address this gap, by establishing political consumerism as a form of economic voting within a
neoliberal economic context.
3.1.2. Political Consumerism as Economic Voting
To the political consumer, the marketplace is being approximated to a democracy in which the
citizen-consumers vote according to their purchasing power, each time they engage in the purchasing
of a product or a service. In a similar vein, Nava [101] stipulates that political consumerism offers
people access to an alternative form of democratic participation. Contrary to the typical model of
electoral politics in which citizens’ participation opportunities are restricted to periodical contests
involving voting for candidates/representatives, engaging in acts of political consumerism presents
additional benefits of frequency and immediacy. On the one hand, people register and reiterate
their political support or opposition to a certain production process on a daily basis via their daily
purchasing decisions. On the other hand, consistent with the notion of the prosumer introduced above,
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they will support certain production processes (and penalise others) directly through the facilitation of
the marketplace rather than through the mediation of their elected representatives.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the politics of consumption are inextricably dependent
on neoliberal doctrines. With its emphasis on rationality, competition, and striving for burgeoning
economic expansion, neoliberalism ceases to be yet another position on the ideological spectrum.
Instead, it has been described as a form of non-politics [102], the only rational and viable way forward.
Neoliberalism thus has accelerated an unequivocal shift from the power of the state to that of the
market. Political consumerism therefore poses as a contentious alternative to the neoliberal hegemony
by augmenting its individualistic contestations with ethical, political, and collective considerations.
The present section will thus investigate the appeal of political consumerism in relation to the
market-based ideology of the neoliberal paradigm. The concept of the ‘marketopoly’ [56] (p. 57)
is indispensable for such an analysis.
‘Marketopoly’ indicates the market itself as the par excellence habitus of political participation.
As Lekakis states, “Marketopoly marks the reign of the market in presenting an opportunity for the
capture of citizenship in its facilitation in the Marketplace” [35] (p. 57), and as such necessitates and
presupposes a market-based ideology as the foundation of its politics of consumption. Neoliberalism
provides the perfect ideological narrative for its emergence, by casting the shadow of the economic
over political citizenship. The guiding elements of the marketopoly, namely, capacity and rationality,
have been internalised by individuals to such a degree that they became the regulating principles of
society as a whole. Similarly, the prevalent notion of freedom is equated to freedom of the market,
devoid of any social, environmental, or ethical considerations. As a result, the classical notions of
citizenship as participation are therefore re-forged into a commodified interpretation of citizenship.
In light of the above, the assumption that economic voting may substitute for political voting
has been heavily contested. Bauman [103] diagnosed the ‘consumerist syndrome’ as an illness of
liquid modernity, whereas Root [104] (p. 71) positions consumer-citizenship as the ‘soft focus of
kitsch’, offering a poor imitation of formal electoral political participation. Instead, the emergence of
consumer-citizenship has been heralded by the proponents of political consumerism as an oppositional
force positioned against the marketisation of political life, by comparing consumers to economic
voters. The ‘new consumer’, socialised in market choice, poses as the democratic response to the
commercialisation of civic action. However, such choice is restricted by the prevalence of economic
over political freedom as dictated by their internalisation of the principles of the marketopoly.
This realisation renders political consumerism a form of political participation which is
inescapably bound by the rationality of the marketopoly. It denotes the penetration of the neoliberal
rationale in the contemporary forms of civic participation, resulting in turn in the commodification of
participation itself. Although the ability to resist commodification should be salient within the various
forms of activism and political action [105], political consumerism is particularly susceptible to it since,
by definition, it adheres to the doctrines of the marketopoly. For Barber, “Commodification is the mode
by which a consumer society reproduces itself, working overtime to create uniform monopolies of taste
and behaviour ( . . . ) To commodify is thus to colonise” [106] (p. 247). The process of commodification
for Barber is therefore reminiscent of Peck’s [50] ‘roll-out’ effects of neoliberalism, which in a similar
way seek to colonise all domains of social life by reducing them to their economic counterparts and
remoulding them in its image [107]. The roll-out effect of neoliberalism therefore becomes especially
intrusive, as it does not merely presuppose the existence of an economism in every domain of social
life, but instead assumes as its primary aim the establishment, propagation, and institutionalisation
of such economism. In doing so, it commodifies—and thus colonises—citizenship by transposing its
enactment from the political arena to that of the marketopoly.
These criticisms tend to present individual citizen-consumers as unavoidably shaped by the
neoliberal dictum, as this has taken form in the marketopoly. As such, they tend to neglect on the
one hand the collective precondition of political consumerism introduced above, and on the other,
the capacity of the empowered citizen-consumer (prosumer) to influence the production process
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and the environment where this takes place. Consequently, they tend to understate the elements of
resistance in the practice of political consumption. Contrary to the increased concern about diminishing
political participation rates—especially among young people—political consumerism provides the
platform to resist, or at least to offset, the impact of the bourgeoning doctrines of neoliberalism [107].
In a romanticized metaphor, the ancient Athenian Agora—literally ‘the Market’—finds its postmodern
equivalent as a locus of political fermentation.
4. Conclusions
As voting turnout demonstrates declining trends, scholars of political participation have started
to examine the increased prevalence of political participation beyond the vote as a significant potential
avenue for alternative civic and political engagement [108]. The present article draws from the
assertion of the existence of a neoliberal ideological hegemony of the marketopoly, so as to associate
the declining levels of electoral engagement among younger generations in post-crisis Europe with the
rise of political consumerism. We discern two contrasting—albeit complimentary—effects: On the one
hand, the internalised neoliberal critique of democracy stresses the ‘push’ effect of the public into the
commercial sphere. In parallel to the ‘push’ effect, which effectively disengages young people from
the traditional political field, the emerging individualisation of modern ‘liquid’ politics advanced by
the post-materialist sensitivities of their previously affluent socialisation call attention to the existence
of a simultaneous ‘pull’ effect into the marketopoly, as a habitus of youth political participation in
post-crisis Europe.
We have considered the ways through which neoliberalism has ‘pushed’ young citizens away
from politics. The neoliberal critique of democracy portrays politicians as not only unable to influence
political outcomes within a technocratic economic environment, but also as inherently selfish and,
as such, not sufficiently trustworthy to represent the mandate of their constituency. Henn and
Oldfield [109] trace the reasons behind young people’s electoral disengagement in contemporary
Britain and locate these as significantly centred on the remote and hierarchical formal democratic
institutions and on the self-serving approach of elitist politicians. Nevertheless, the same research
reveals that contrary to popular belief, young people are not apathetic, and would in fact be interested
in participating in decisions that pertain to them should they be able to shape political discussion in
ways that address their concerns and hopes. Instead, they have found themselves in a marginalised
position within the traditional political sphere, and feel disillusioned and incapacitated to actualise
their interests within the existing political arena. Consequently, many young people have sought and
found the ‘political’ within the context of the marketopoly, and have thus adopted it as the par excellence
domain where they may express their postmaterialist and postmodern concerns as citizen-consumers.
In such a context [110], we have identified and problematised four separate but interconnected
‘pull’ factors that render political consumerism particularly appealing. Firstly, the ability of the
citizen-consumer to customise the products to fit their individual requirements; secondly, the ability
to tailor the prices according to their budget; thirdly, the availability of information and ease of
communication with regard to their purchasing decisions; and finally, the trust in the market
environment. The first two factors are related to the consumer’s ability to influence the production
process, reflecting the argument of Kotler et al. [79] set out above in relation to the emergence of the
prosumer. The third is linked to the collective appeal of political consumerism [33], which harnesses
the individual consumer’s power into collective public issues. Despite its essentially individualistic
nature, political consumerism conveys strong collective underpinnings. For instance, Zukin et al. [100]
(p. 79) report that citizens participate in acts of political consumerism “because it’s a good thing to do”,
emphasising an ethical individualistic tendency. However, Micheletti and Stolle [111] also identify
‘social solidarity’ as a determinant for political consumerism, drawing political consumerism as a form
of ‘individualised-collective action’, which does not perpetuate the cleavage between individualistic
and collective action, but rather reconciles the two. In any case, both determinants draw a picture of
an empowered, primarily postmaterialist [90,103] citizen-consumer who, having been socialised under
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material conditions of relative affluence, will place emphasis on ethical and solidarity considerations
behind their purchasing behaviour. Finally, the fourth factor of trust in the market environment
reiterates the internalised neoliberal doctrines of the neoliberal subject in line with the discussion
above, as these have been consolidated by its roll-out process.
The decline of electoral participation does not designate the end of citizenship, but merely its
transformation and diffusion into alternative fields. As a form of political participation that operates within
the marketopoly, political consumerism is susceptible to the neoliberal mentality. Yet, as the definitions
of political participation are expanding to include individualised or lifestyle forms of engagement, so is
the concept of citizenship. Armed with postmaterialist considerations, the emergence of the empowered
citizen-consumer as a by-product of the neoliberal roll-out process provides consumerism with the
necessary elements of citizenship, and enables citizen-consumers to appraise or penalise market forces.
We posit that, contrary to the increased concern about diminishing political engagement, especially
among the younger generations, political consumerism provides a framework for responding to the
individualisation and strict ‘economism’ of the neoliberal tenets. Disenfranchised and disillusioned
by the capacity of the purely political sphere to respond to their individualised claims, and having
internalised the neoliberal critique of democracy, the young empowered citizen-consumers demonstrate
noteworthy reflexivity to the spirit of the times. It is thus not surprising that the citizen-consumer,
equipped with the freedom provided by postmodern liquid politics, driven by postmaterialist
sensitivities but simultaneously instilled with the internalised conviction in favour of the seemingly
ubiquitous market, will inevitably seek the ‘political’ within the bounds of the marketplace. It may
therefore be argued that if neoliberalism perceives competition as the primary characteristic of human
interaction and as such it reinvents citizens as consumers, political consumerism responds by redefining
consumers as citizens.
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